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This paper describes the very different role played by female elites in contemporary 
developing countries, as compared to the ‘early’ industrializing countries of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. It shows that women are far more important in 
business and politics in today’s developing countries than they were in developed 
countries at a period when the latter had equivalent, and indeed significantly higher, 
levels of income per capita. It outlines the way in which this greater equality is rooted in 
educational opportunities; and argues that both educational provision, and women’s 
entry into the elites, must be understood with reference to changing values and attitudes. 
They are not simply economically determined. Finally, the paper underlines the way in 
which these features of business and politics strengthen elite families in developing 
economies. 
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It is a truism that economic development in the late twentieth and twenty-first century 
has followed paths which are profoundly different from those of the ‘First World’. 
However, most discussions focus on the economic and technological environments 
which developing countries face. This paper looks instead at a curiously neglected 
phenomenon: the radically different opportunities for women in today’s developing 
countries, and, specifically, the different role of women among the elites of early, and 
later, developers. 
 
The broad outlines of development past and present are well rehearsed. First time 
around, a gradual growth in trade, and a comprehensive shift from subsistence to 
marketized agriculture preceded the industrial revolution and the enormous output 
growth and demographic transition that it engendered. When Britain became the first 
industrialized country, it did not have access to the huge global markets of today; and 
while the harnessing of carbon-based energy brought a rapid decline in the cost of 
transporting goods, these costs remained enormously high in purchasing power terms by 
the standards of 2010. Germany, France and the US industrialized a little later than the 
UK, but were not involved in anything like the sort of technology and productivity 
‘catch-up’ which characterize today’s development successes.  
 
Differences are very marked with respect to the flow of ideas and values. Intellectuals, 
and scientists of the mid nineteenth century were in contact with each other – as, indeed, 
Adam Smith was with his eighteenth century French and German contemporaries 
(Rothschild 2001) – but largely within a small group of Western countries. Economic 
and political ideas certainly spread, via these networks, and gave us a century of 
Communism. But there was nothing approaching a world language. Travel was 
expensive, even with the advent of the railways. Few books were translated. Members 
of future national elites attended universities in their home country. There was neither 
Hollywood nor Bollywood, and, obviously enough, no internet.  
 
Today, we have something very close, in many ways, to a ‘global village’ (McLuhan 
1962). Just 250 years ago, tiny numbers of the British rich – and only the rich – adopted 
the ‘Grand Tour’ as a way of educating their sons – and only their sons. Today, small 
farmers and labourers whose incomes are low, and whose countries are poor, and with 
large remaining sections of subsistence-agriculture, have access not only to TV and 
films but also to mobile telephony. Hundreds of millions of people, in countries with 
incomes per capita way below those of the US or Western Europe in 1910, have 
personal internet access. And the world’s elites increasingly educate their children, male 
and female, for a global existence, in international schools, and ‘top’ universities, 
identified from high profile league tables (Wolf 2002). 
 
This paper is about an important and surprisingly unnoticed aspect of economic 
development in this different twenty-first century world. The first time round, in 
nineteenth century Europe and America, women played very little direct role in the 
upper ranks of politics and business. If they were visible at all it was as appendages of a 
powerful man or through hereditary positions. In that sense, as much as any other, 
modern development is utterly different. 
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Today, women in developing countries enter and occupy elite positions directly and 
independently, in large numbers. This is a profound difference; and it is one which, I 
will suggest, can only be explained by the international spread of ideas, and values 
through modern telecommunications and entertainment, by modern education and aid 
patterns, and, above all, by the increasingly international experiences of almost every 
country’s elites, and of their children. 
2 Invisible  women? 
One reason this dramatic difference has been so little remarked upon is the way in 
which women’s affairs are reported. In developed countries, this is overwhelmingly in 
terms of cups-half-full, glass ceilings and the like (see, for example, Hewlett 2007). 
These make for good headlines. Grant Thornton International, for example, publishes an 
annual International Business Report which includes one of the few annual, 
international surveys of ‘top’ women in business – albeit in a particular section of it 
(namely, top privately owned companies). In 2009, they reported that between 2004 and 
2008 there was ‘only a marginal improvement’ in the percentage of senior level 
management positions held by women in these businesses worldwide.1 This ‘marginal 
improvement’ was from 19 per cent to 24 per cent – which one can also describe as an 
increase of over 25 per cent in the space of four years. So it does depend on your 
perspective! 
 
The literature on developing countries, meanwhile, focuses largely on the experiences 
of the female poor. It is concerned with the extent to which schooling is equally 
accessible to boys and girls, and with addressing gender differences in literacy. ‘Educate 
the women’ is regarded as one of the best strategies – almost a cast-iron guarantee – for 
growth, and championed by aid agencies and campaigners (see, for example, Kristof 
and WuDunn 2009). Educated women, it is assumed, will take control of their fertility, 
educate their own children better, and adopt better health practices. 
 
The sub-text here is that opportunities remain deeply unequal, and women a generally 
subjugated group. Kristof and WuDunn (2009), for example, focus on extraordinary and 
inspirational stories, such as the ‘brothel slave’ who becomes a businesswoman. And, 
indeed, for the population as a whole, opportunities are indeed highly unequal in many 
parts of the world. At the extreme, there remain countries and regions (such as those 
dominated by fundamentalist Islamic groups, including the Taliban) which deny the 
legitimacy of any formal education or formal labour market role for women.  
 
However, this approach also tends to leave the impression that only small numbers of 
women are being educated in developing countries, and that all their women are 
oppressed, which is far from the truth. In reality, outside a very limited number of 
countries, the world has come to accept the idea that men and women should have equal 
opportunities in education and the workplace. This is itself a function of the rapid 
spread of ideas, values and assumptions across the contemporary globe. Of course not 
all countries are the same, but most of them sign up to a large number of common 
values. Even if the commitment to female equality is to a degree lip-service, this does 
not stop it having a concrete, substantive impact on legal codes, access to education, and 
social and economic behaviour. There are many millions of highly successful 
                                                 
1 www.internationalbusinessreport.com  
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professional and business women in today’s developing countries, and the gender 
composition of their elites has been transformed. Yet these highly successful women are 
invisible, ignored by women’s studies and development literature alike. 
 
This paper describes key aspects of this phenomenon, in order to demonstrate how 
different ‘early’ and ‘late’ development have been in terms of female elite participation. 
It highlights business, education and politics; and offers some tentative explanations. 
These striking differences will undoubtedly have implications for how development 
proceeds. I do not know of anyone who has teased this out systematically, but do 
speculate a little on what the implications might be for continuing differences between 
‘old’ developed and ‘new’ developing nations and more specifically for their future 
elites.  
3  The first developed countries 
Two hundred years ago, in 1810, mainland Britain was on the verge of the industrial 
revolution: the first country to be so. It had banished famine long before: the last was in 
the 1620s, although other European countries experienced them for far longer.2 It had 
left subsistence agriculture behind: from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, the 
whole country was fully integrated into a market-based economy (Floud and Johnson 
2004). The ideas of Adam Smith, for all that he was seen by many as a dangerous 
radical, were increasingly influential: free trade, competition, an extended franchise 
were the fundamental tenets of early nineteenth century liberalism (Rothschild 2001). 
 
Yet although the economy was being transformed by entrepreneurs, business-owners, 
investors and inventors, hardly a single one of them was female. Victoria would be the 
‘defining’ monarch of the coming century, but her position was entirely hereditary. The 
Duchess of Devonshire might have hit headlines and dominated gossip columns for 
trading kisses for votes in support of her favoured candidate, but British women were 
less empowered politically than they had been in many previous centuries, barred from 
voting by their gender even if they were property-owners and rate-payers. The dominant 
concerns of all women, across all social classes, were far more similar than they are 
today, and entirely domestic. Smith himself took this for granted. He hardly mentions 
women in ‘The Wealth of Nations’, and when he does it is to remark, admiringly, that 
women’s education, determined entirely by their parent or guardian, all ‘tends evidently 
to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to 
form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy; to render them both 
likely to become the mistresses of a family and to behave properly when they have 
become such’ (Smith 1776: Book 5, chapter 1, Part 3). 
 
Smith was being entirely realistic. This was all that educated, and, indeed all educated 
elite women’s lives, did offer. This did not mean that such women – meaning the 
daughters, wives and mothers of elite men – were idle. In The Gentleman’s Daughter, 
her wonderful study of eighteenth century women’s lives, Amanda Vickery quotes one 
of her feminine subjects, writing that ‘my time is always imployed and if I do take a pen 
I always meet with some interruption’. This would have been literal truth, certainly once 
child-bearing began. These women were responsible for running quite substantial 
                                                 
2  Including, notoriously, Ireland, ruled by Britain and still characterized, in the nineteenth century, by 
subsistence farming on a large scale.   
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households, had demanding and recurring nursing duties; and also bore the main 
responsibility for bringing up, and for much of the education of their children, including 
teaching them to read and write (Vickery 1998). 
 
Women have always worked and not just in caring for household and family. Elite 
women were unable to work for money: non-elite women could and did. For non-
married women outside the affluent middle classes, full time work until marriage was, 
of necessity, quite as much a norm as it was for men.  
 
From the mid-nineteenth century on, we know what women in industrializing countries 
did. The 1851 UK Census, for example, numbered thousands of female bookbinders, 
silk cloth manufacturers, artificial flower makers, and earthenware manufacturers, 
50,000 female cooks and 675,000 general females domestics. But on the eve of the 
Great Exhibition, demonstrating Britain’s industrial might to the world, and in a society 
which was highly urbanized, a world Empire, and the richest per capita in Europe, the 
only salaried middle-class females, were the 42,000 teachers it enumerated. Forty years 
on, in the 1891 census, there were still just 101 female physicians, though almost 2 
million female industrial workers and 1.7 million female domestics.  
 
By the early twentieth century a large proportion of wealth was held by women, but this 
was by inheritance, as there were a large number of wealthy widows. The first female 
MP to take her seat in the British Parliament did so only in 1919; she was Nancy Astor, 
a society hostess and an agitator for social reform. She was elected to Parliament just 
three years after the first woman was elected to the US House of Representatives. 
Barbara Wootton, one of the most eminent British women of her generation – and 
widowed, like so many, as a young World War I bride – became a magistrate in 1925, at 
the age of 28, two years before she would be allowed to vote! (Women had to be 30 to 
vote in Britain until 1929.) 
TABLES 1 AND 2 
What was true for politics was equally true for the professions, and business was even 
harder to penetrate. Table 1 (for the UK) and Table 2 (for the US) summarize the very 
slow rate at which women penetrated the professional and business elites in the sense of 
taking paid positions or heading their own firms and practices, as opposed to marrying 
elite men. Figure 1 uses the (typical) case of the UK to illustrate women’s penetration of 
the universities; faster than for economic life, but still lagging behind men well into 
periods of very high income per capita, and advanced industrialization.  
FIGURE 1 
The critical point for my argument here is not that women were not equal; clearly they 
were not, as we all well know. What is remarkable is the degree of inequality, given the 
level of economic development. The charts cover years when income per capita in these 
countries was already significantly higher than for the big developing countries of today 
such as China, India, Indonesia. For many decades, when the ‘First World’ was 
enjoying income levels which have not yet been attained in the bulk of Asia and Africa, 
women played very little independent role in the labour market other than as servants, 
factory workers, cooks, and shop assistants. The only major exceptions to this pattern 
were teachers and nurses – jobs which led on directly from the traditional female roles 
of child care and sickroom attendant. They received the vote far later than men; they  
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were barely represented in political life. As the rest of this paper shows, the situation in 
today’s developing countries is manifestly different. 
4  Female elites in the developing world 
From the point of view of this paper, the key differences between ‘first phase’ 
development and current development can be demonstrated under three headings – 
education, business and politics. 
4.1 Education 
The early stages of industrialization were also, in Europe and North America, periods 
when the state became directly involved in providing and paying for schooling. This 
happened with varying speed – sooner in Germany, later in England – and some 
historians have queried whether it was in any sense ‘necessary’. (In England, for 
example, there was very high participation in elementary education well before the 1870 
Education Act which nationalized most elementary schools and made attendance 
compulsory (West 1994). However, the general trend was uniform: a gradual move first 
to compulsory elementary and then to compulsory secondary schooling. Higher 
education has also expanded as developed countries have grown richer – again at 
varying speeds with the US having the fastest and earliest expansion (both in absolute 
terms and in relation to GDP per capita) and Switzerland the smallest. At every point 
women entered a given phase of education more slowly than men.3 
 
There are two striking difference between the pattern just described for ‘first phase’ 
developers, and what is happening in today’s developing countries. The first is the 
overall level of formal education attained for a given level of GDP per capita. The 
second is the speed with which women are attaining equal (or higher) participation 
levels.  
 
University education is of particular interest because of its role as a route into the elite. 
Figure 2 illustrates how university participation patterns developed among the early 
industrializers and some successful Asian countries. As it shows, participation has 
tended to remain quite low for many years, and then increase dramatically, in a ‘reverse 
L’ pattern that is common to every rich country (see Wolf 2002 for a discussion of this 
pattern). The US expansion came first; but European countries followed, generally at 
levels of per capita wealth which were slightly but not enormously higher than for the 
US case.  
FIGURE 2 
By contrast, the Asian countries shown had much higher participation levels for a given 
level of per capita income than any of the ‘old’ rich. The same is true for today’s 
developing countries. For a given level of wealth, their university participation rates are 
far higher than was the case for the first industrializing countries. 
 
                                                 
3  With a single exception: teacher training colleges for elementary school teachers, which in some 
countries were separately organized.  
  6
Second, and even more marked, are the relatively high levels of female participation 
which occurs in developing countries compared to the levels which characterized most 
developed countries as recently as the 1950s and 1960s. Table 3 illustrates this, showing 
the most recent available figures on the gender breakdown of the higher education 
student body for a range of ‘old’ developed countries and new developing ones. They 
are barely higher for the former than for the latter. In ‘Type A’ courses (what we think 
of traditional university study) all the developed countries now have a female majority: 
so do half the developing ones. In the more applied and vocational Type 4, major 
differences in countries’ economies and their organization of higher vocational study 
make for major differences within the two groups (32 per cent female in Finland, 62 per 
cent in Belgium): but here too, what is striking is how close the distributions are for the 
developed and developing country groups. 
TABLE 3 
What accounts for this change? 
These educational developments are a necessary condition – though by no means a 
sufficient one – for the female elite penetration of business and politics which I turn to 
below. So it is worth asking why they have occurred? Are they essentially economic, a 
response to delayed development which can be explained in terms of demand for skills? 
 
Certainly today’s developing countries need a very different skill mix than did Britain in 
1810 or 1840, if they are to participate in the global economy. This is a world of trade 
laws, and record keeping; and one in which even a small agricultural exporter, deep in a 
rural area, must interact with suppliers and purchasers constantly, using both written 
(typed) messages and statistical packages. More generally, since they are playing 
‘catch-up’, developing countries are orienting themselves to the technologies of today’s 
developed world, not of the much less educated and technically advanced one of 1900.  
 
However, it is hard to see this as explaining such high levels of female participation in 
and of itself. Developing countries almost all have an over-supply of skills, especially 
those which are learned in classrooms – as, indeed, does the developed world (Wolf 
2004). Just as European countries were all able to grow adequately with very little 
female participation in middle-class and professional jobs, right up until World War II, 
so, in principle, could today’s developing countries. There are plenty of under-used 
male skills and abilities out there. 
 
One has, instead, to look to ideas and values for a good part of the explanation. High 
levels of educational participation generally reflect deliberate government policies, 
based on beliefs that expanding education can and generate growth in and of itself, as 
much as they do labour market demand (see Wolf 2002 for a critique of this position). 
But equal, or near-equal, female participation, especially in the higher reaches of 
education, reflect the demands of a democratic electorate demanding opportunities for 
their children, and the preferences of the politically important middle classes.  
 
In both government policy and citizen pressure and demands, the impact of modern 
values and ideas is clear. Governments not only pay lip-service to gender equality, but 
in many cases genuinely offer equal educational access to both girls and boys. (Aid 
agencies encourage this, but certainly cannot ensure it if a host society is opposed: and 
in any case, provide only a portion of the relevant funding in a portion of the developing  
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world.) Critically, middle-class and wealthy families, in developing countries, ensure 
that their daughters are highly educated, and prepared for careers, in a way that neither 
their recent ancestors, nor those of today’s Westerners, would have contemplated.  
 
In this context, Figure 3 is highly illuminating. One feature of today’s globe is the rise 
of international schooling, both secondary and tertiary. There is a global elite which 
increasingly attends the same undergraduate and graduate schools; and we can also 
chart the rise of English-language international schools for secondary education, used 
particularly by developing country elites. Their preferred graduating qualification is the 
International Baccalaureate: and Figure 3 shows the gender breakdown for recent 
candidate groups. Once again, what is striking, given the stage of development of many 
of these students’ home countries, is the level of female participation. These students 
are financed by their parents, who are paying very high fees for their children’s 
education: and they are paying for more daughters than sons. 
FIGURE 3 
4.2 Business 
Most of the world’s ‘businessmen’ are, indeed, men. But nothing like all. And again, 
this is an area where women’s trajectory is quite different in the developing world from 
the one which characterized the first, or indeed second, wave of developed countries. 
 
In the West, women’s entry into business and commerce is very recent indeed – far 
more so than for the professions. To see how recent, it is worth looking – as I recently 
did – at the alumnae records of Somerville College Oxford. Somerville, one of Oxford 
University’s first and most academic women’s colleges, provides a good microcosm of 
female elite careers in the developed world over the last century and a bit. In 1888, for 
example, 10 years after the College was founded, only three ex-students are reported to 
be working other than as active teachers: one as a missionary, one a school manager and 
one a college principal. In 1938, the College Register summarized careers to date. 
Twenty-five of the 34 members of the class of 1896 are there. Just over a third had 
married, generally combining this with some form of volunteer and service work: the 
other two-thirds had not, and of this latter group all but four had made their careers in 
education – the exceptions being a nun, a hospital matron, a librarian and a health 
visitor. 
 
As late as 1920, we find a (much larger) class matriculating of whom just two, an art 
dealer and a director of an iron-founders, made ‘non-caring’ careers. Teaching, at 
school or university level, remained the majority occupation by far for this generation, 
accounting for 80 per cent of those who reported recent or current paid employment. 
 
Only when we get to the class of 1980 do things change. Here, only 10 per cent report a 
school-teaching career. They are outnumbered by accountants, and part of a group 
where bankers, management consultants and marketing managers are all more 
numerous than librarians or even university lecturers. 
 
As a highly academic institution, this was unlikely to produce many entrepreneurs 
although it is, now, starting to produce top managers in FTSE 100 companies. But we 
can also see from national Censuses how slowly women were able to enter management 
in large firms or head their own small companies. It is not just the returns for 1910 (see  
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Tables 1 and 2) that reveal tiny numbers of female business managers and owners. The 
same holds – for the US, UK, and other European countries – right through into the 
1950s. 
 
Contrast this with China, where income per capita is still, in 2010, below America’s a 
century earlier. This is a country where girls were once valued so little that daughters 
were sometimes just numbered, without a proper name of their own, and where a market 
economy was embraced only in 1992.  
 
But China is now home to Zhang Yin, with a personal fortune of US$3.4 billion, from a 
scrap-paper and recycling business that she launched from scratch in the late 1980s. She 
is far from singular. Zhang Xin is the strategic head of the vast SOHO China 
development company she runs with her husband. Chen Ningning and Lu Hui created 
and chair Pioneer Metal Holdings; Yang Huiyan is another huge property developer. 
Meanwhile PepsiCo, for example, has a global CEO, Indra Nooyi, who is female and 
was both born and educated in India. America in 1910 had no such women.  
 
Early feminists often argued that it is ridiculous for an economy to deny itself the output 
of half its educated brains. The fact that so many occupations were effectively closed to 
women, even in the post-war period, when households were increasingly easy to run, is 
a sign that values and attitudes can and do rule out what seems like obvious profit-
increasing strategies. Today, while all major developing countries offer women more 
chances in business and commerce than Western countries did, differences between 
them again underline the importance of culture. 
 
China is a front-runner in this respect, and, as so often, a comparison between it and 
India indicates how differently development can play out. The Grant Thornton 
International business reports estimate that, among large privately held businesses in 
China, women occupy about 31 per cent of senior management positions, one of the 
highest in the world; and that more than 80 per cent of such businesses have senior 
female managers. Chinese government statistics indicate that 41 per cent of private 
sector enterprise owners are women. While many of these will be tiny retail outlets, the 
figure is nonetheless much higher than for India. Indeed, as Table 4 shows, in terms of 
female representation within large businesses, China is very similar to the developed 
countries of the region.  
TABLE 4 
This is not to imply that there is gender equality – Figure 5, drawing on the full Census, 
makes this clear. But this is a country where, to repeat a previous point, GDP per capita 
is still below that of America in 1910 – a time when the US had no ‘Forbes List’ women 
entrepreneurs, no female senior managers in its big corporations, and not a single 
national-level female legislator.  
 
It is, to belabour the point, at elite level that the contrasts are most striking. Thailand 
offers another example of this point. Across the economy as a whole, women remain 
under-represented in professional and managerial levels; international agencies do not 
rank the country very high on gender equality, and note the continuation of cultural 
norms and attitudes which militate against female advancement (Yukongdi 2009). Yet 
in family-owned and private companies – which are extremely important in the Thai 
economy – women have been doing very well indeed. The Grant Thornton International  
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Business Report, referred to earlier, found that Thailand was one of the world’s leaders 
in terms of female representation at senior level in large, privately held businesses, with 
38 per cent of such positions held by women in 2009. 
 
India offers an interesting comparison, for its differences and its similarities. Overall, in 
business, women have made far fewer inroads than in its fellow-giant, China, even 
though they have had some remarkable and high-profile successes – including in large, 
multinational, publicly quoted companies. Figures 4 and 5 show that Indian women 
remain a small proportion of managers and proprietors in the economy as a whole. The 
difference between India and China (like that between Japan and Singapore – see Table 
4) reflects the importance of values and culture, interacting with economic development 
and business structure. That said, India also demonstrates the basic point that 
developing countries today offer women serious business opportunities that were never 
available to Western women in the first century and a half of industrialization. India is, 
after all, is a country with a vast, rural hinterland, less ‘advanced’ in terms of 
engagement with the market than anywhere and everywhere on the British mainland in 
1900, 1800 or indeed 1700.  
FIGURES 4 AND 5 
4.3 Politics 
Until very recently, all women in politics owed their position to family connections. But 
increasingly, independent women politicians are appearing – and again, not only in the 
West (Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel) but in the developing world. And while 
family remains important, especially in the developing world (as, indeed, it does in 
business), it is no longer a prerequisite for success. India, for example, has seen the rise 
of very powerful female politicians with no family base – Kumari Mayawati, Jayalalitha 
Jayaram and Mamata Banerjee among them. They had no equivalents in nineteenth or 
indeed most of twentieth century Europe or North America. 
 
As with education, the economy is not an adequate explanation. But it is surely critical 
that most of the world’s developing countries today have universal suffrage: most of the 
developed world, when they were at this level of income did not. This does not mean 
that women vote for female candidates: There is nothing to suggest, anywhere in 
today’s developed or developing world, that a candidate’s gender is critically important 
in how women vote. But it does indicate that it is now completely unacceptable and 
illegitimate, outside a very few countries, to discriminate explicitly by gender with 
respect to suffrage and access to legislative office.  
 
Women remain the minority – often a small minority – of politicians in most countries 
of the globe. But once again, what is striking is the difference between developing and 
developed world in terms of female representation at a given stage of wealth 
acquisition. Indeed, on this indicator – see Table 5 – the countries which are world 
‘leaders’ in terms of female representation in politics are as likely to be developing (and 
often African) as Western. The Scandinavians are predictably high in the ‘female 
legislators’ rankings: but it is Rwanda which is top, and more than half the top twenty-
five are developing nations. 
 
TABLE 5  
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5  ELITE WOMEN: THE ADVANTAGES OF LIFE IN A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY 
In the discussion so far, I have emphasized how ideas and values, dominant in today’s 
developed world, have also been adopted by today’s developing countries and led to 
opportunities for women which never existed in the early periods of industrialization. 
Elite women in developing countries are the greatest beneficiaries of this, and of the 
way in which values and perceptions have moved across the globe far faster than wealth 
has equalized. They benefit at home and are also, again unlike their predecessors, able 
to lead very international lives themselves. 
 
Developing country elites, especially the female members, in key respects, have an 
easier time of it than the elites of the developed world. They have domestic help and not 
only is it cheap, but it is legitimate and ‘normal’. An elite female in the contemporary 
US or UK, working in a job which put her in the top 10 per cent of earnings, can easily 
find that her whole post-tax salary just covers the cost of domestic help in the form of 
one nanny and a part-time cleaner. This would not be true for her Indian equivalent 
today. And at a time when domestic labour was cheap in the now-developed world, 
most of the professional job market was closed to women.  
 
Understanding the domestic context of elite women’s lives is also important because of 
the general importance of family. Family connections matter in all societies, but they 
are critical in understanding how and why female elites have become so much more 
prominent in today’s developing countries than they were a century ago in the West. 
The pattern of female political leaders, inheriting fathers’ or husbands’ mantles, has 
been much emphasized and is indeed still important – Indira Gandhi and Sonia in India, 
Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Cory Aquino in the Philippines. But as we saw earlier, there 
are also increasing numbers of female politicians who are not daughters, sisters, 
widows. What is happening, though is a more general ‘family inheritance’ pattern, 
which encompasses the whole business sector, as well as spilling into politics. 
 
The key point is that families – fathers, parents – do not, today, particularly favour sons 
over daughters. They educate them alike (in the context of smaller families); involve 
them both in the business; and while a son-in-law may be actively engaged in the 
business into which he married, so, today, is the boss’s daughter who brought him there. 
This, I would argue, illustrates once again the importance of changing, international 
values and attitudes in helping to explain behaviour, and, specifically, female elite 
formation. 
 
Because government and business opportunities are, in many developing countries, 
intertwined in a very open and personal way, this can generate ‘power couples’ and 
‘power families’ with very far-reaching interests and power. (Russia and South Africa 
both afford striking examples; while in China, many of the privileged children of the 
Politburo have accumulated business interests.) Particularly striking in this context are 
the ‘family-states’ of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Tadjikistan (Kydyralieva 2009). All five were communist until recently, none has 
established a stable democracy; moreover, all are Islamic, and so might be expected, a 
priori, to treat men and women very differently.4 But in fact, what is happening is that, 
                                                 
4  In fact, the central Asian republics have been rather more like Europe, and rather less like the Arab 
states, than one might expect from their religion (Weatherford 2010).  
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in every case, ruling presidents have trusted, promoted, and ruled through their 
daughters as much as their sons. States where ruling families expropriate national 
wealth are nothing new. But ‘family-states’ practising gender equality in this way are 
new.  
 
What of the future? With the rise of female education, married couples across the world 
are increasingly ‘assortatively mated’ in education and career terms, especially in the 
elites. And one clear result of the ‘costs’ of family life in the developed world is that 
elite women have very few children and the same is true of elite men. Of course, birth-
rates have dropped everywhere, while remaining highest in the poorest countries, and 
are higher, within countries, among the poor.  
 
Nonetheless, here too, there are differences between the elites of the developed and 
developing worlds. In India, for example, graduate women are overwhelmingly likely to 
marry – over 95 per cent do – and also far more likely to bear children than their 
Western counterparts. Among Indian graduate women aged between 35 and 39 at the 
last Census, less than 10 per cent were childless. The comparable figures for the US and 
UK is over a third. Moreover, in India, a half of those female graduates who have been 
married had 2 children, and a fifth had 3 or more – a much higher fertility rate than is 
common among educated women in the west. And these are not a tiny minority on the 
contrary, they are part of a generation which experienced a doubling in female graduate 
numbers from 733,000 to 1,493,000 (with a further doubling, incidentally, for those ten 
years younger.) 
 
In the West, there has been considerable and growing concern about social mobility and 
its perceived decline. But in fact, given the failure of either elite men or elite women to 
reproduce themselves as a group – the mean fertility rate for Harvard/Radcliffe women 
and Harvard/Radcliffe men is less than 1.5 – there is bound to be mobility into the top 
echelons of society even if all the children of elite, assortatively sorted couples do well 
themselves (Goldin and Katz 2008). 
 
In developing countries, the rapid expansion of middle class jobs, under conditions of 
high economic growth, ensures that the absolute number of highly ‘desirable’ jobs 
grows fast without requiring downward mobility in order to open up vacancies. But at 
the very very top, current patterns – female education in elite schools, career success, 
plus higher birthrates – make it quite possible to imagine that very closed elites, made 
up of powerful political and business families, will be able to perpetuate themselves for 
a long time. New-style development is very good for equal opportunity in gender terms. 
It is not obvious that it will necessarily be more ‘equal opportunity’, this time round, in 
any other way. 
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Table 1: Female labour force participation, UK 1891 
 
Percentage of all females:    Percentage of total 
number employed who 
were female: 
 
In labour force5  35  All occupations classified 
as ‘professional’ 
49 
In occupations classified as 
‘professional’ 
3 ‘Professional’  occupations 
excluding nursing 
43 
Percentage of employed 
females 
 ‘Professional’  occupations 
excluding nursing and 
teaching 
17 
In ‘professional’ occupations  8  Engineers  0 
In ‘professional’ occupations, 
excluding teaching and 
nursing 
1 Lawyers  0.003 
   ‘Commercial’  occupations  3 
 
Source: UK Census, 1891. 
Note: In the 2001 UK Census men accounted for 66 per cent of managers and senior officials; 
and 59 per cent of professional occupations. Although women still heavily outnumbered men 
among ‘teaching and research professionals’, they also accounted for 14 per cent of science 
and technology professionals. There were 106,000 such female science professionals and 
856,000 corporate managers: the latter accounted for 8 per cent of total female employment 
and 14 per cent of male. 
                                                 
5  This is higher than for the US where the per cent of females age 10+ who were gainfully employed 
was only 14.7 per cent in 1880 and 23.4 per cent in 1910. This almost certainly reflects the greater 
role of agriculture – and more specifically of family farms – in the US economy: as late as 1910. 
Thirty-six per cent of employed males and 22 per cent of females worked in agriculture.   
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Table 2: Professionals and managers: gender break-down, US 1910 
 
Source: US Census, 1910, Volume 4: Population: Occupation Statistics. 
  
   Total Male Female   
Population 10 years of age and over 71,580,270 37,027,558 34,552,712  
Industry and occupation   Total Male Female 
Female workers
in this category 
as % of female 
population
              
Bankers, brokers and money lenders 105,804 103,170 2,634  0.000076
Bankers and bank officials  56,059 54,387 1,672 0.000048
Commercial brokers and commission men  24,009 23,690 319  0.0000092
Loan brokers and loan company officials  2,111 1,989 122  0.0000035
Stockbrokers 13,729 13,522 207  0.0000059
Pawnbrokers 1,232 1,191 41  0.0000012
Brokers not specified and promoters 8,664 8,391 273  0.0000079
              
Insurance agents and officials  97,964 95,302 2,652  0.000077
Insurance agents  88,463 85,926 2,537  0.000073
Officials of insurance companies 9,501 9,376 125 0.0000036
              
Proprietors, officials, and managers 22,862 21,352 1,010  0.000029
Employment office keepers  2,260 1,540 720  0.000021
Proprietors, etc., warehouses  4,393 4,868 25  0.00000072
Other proprietors, officials and managers 10,591 10,339 252  0.0000073
              
Real estate (agents and officials) 125,862 122,935 2,927  0.000084
Manufacturing managers & supt.s 104,201  102,748  1,462    0.000042 
Wholesale merchants and dealers (importers and 
exporters) 4,905 4,722 183  0.0000053
             
Judges, justices and magistrates  6,816 6,816 0  0
Lawyers 107,888 107,330 558  0.000016
Abstractors, notaries, and justices of the peace  7,445 6,660 785  0.000023
              
Professors in colleges and universities 15,668 12,710 2,958  0.000086
Teachers (athletics, dancing etc.) 3,931 2,768 1,163  0.000034
Teachers (school)  595,306 118,442 470,804 1.36
   
Electricians, engineers & surveyors  204,875 204,778 97  0.00000028 
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Table 3: Female participation in higher education, for selected developed and developing 
countries’ percentage female graduates, first degree 
 
Country (most recent 
available figures) 
Tertiary (type B)  Tertiary (type A) 
Brazil 2004  39  64 
China 2005/6  47  44 
Indonesia 2004/5  46  48 
Jordan 2004/5  63  52 
Peru 2005  58  n/a 
Thailand 2004/5  34  60 
    
Australia 2005  53  59 
Belgium 2004/5  62  54 
Finland 2003/4  32  63 
Germany 2004/5  61  51 
Spain 2004/5  53  60 
USA 2004/5  61  57 
 
Source: UNESCO World Education Indicators 2007. 
 
 
Table 4: Average female representation in the workforce of the 10 largest multi-nationals 
operating in East Asia 
 
Country  % in total 
workforce of 
companies 






% in senior 
positions 





China 44.3  53.5  28.7  13  45 
India 28.1  34.1  16.2  8.2  18 
Japan  41.2 50 20.7 8.9  41 
Singapore  40.1 52 34.4  17.3 43 
 
Sources: Gender Diversity in Asia report by Community Business, Hong Kong 
(www.communitybusiness.org); ILO statistics. 
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Table 5: Women’s share as legislators in lower or single legislative House, May 2009 
 
1. Rwanda  56.3  13. Norway 36.1 
2. Sweden  47 14.  Belgium  35.3 
3. South Africa  43.5  15 Mozambique  34.8 
4. Cuba  43.2  16. New Zealand  33.6 
5. Iceland  42.9 17.  Nepal  33.2 
6. Finland  41.5 18.  Germany  32.2 
7. Netherlands  41.3  20. Belarus  31.8 
8. Argentina  40  21. Uganda  30.7 
9. Denmark  38 22.  Burundi  30.5 
10. Angola  37.3  23. Tanzania  30.4 
11. Costa Rica  36.8  24.Guyana  30 
12. Spain  36.3  25 Timor-Lests  29.2 
 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. 









Note: Fulltime enrolment are overwhelmingly composed of young recent school-leavers. This is 

















Figure 2: The expansion of higher education in selected countries: proportion of school-leavers 




Source: OECD, UNESCO, French Ministry of Education statistics. 
 
 


































Source: Census of India 2001 Table B-25. 
 
 
Figure 5: Gender breakdown for production and operations department managers, India 2001, 




Source: Census of India 2001 Table B-25. 
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